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The paper examines the link between the precision of the available monetary policy
indicators and the determinacy of equilibrium in a forward-looking macroeconomic model
with partial information and an optimizing central bank. When the information on
endogenous variables is not precise enough, the central bank acts too timidly; there is a
possibility of self-fulfilling fluctuations in inflation and output. It is argued that, unless they
are very precise, projections of output or inflation over the relevant horizon cannot be the
only criterion for determining monetary policy actions. Rules which include a sufficient
reaction to nominal variables may be necessary to supply an anchor for prices, even when
the policymaker intends to consider all relevant information. Appointing a “conservative”
central banker may also induce a less timid response to signs of inflation or deflation, even
when their interpretation is difficult. In contrast, relying too much on measures of exogenous
variables, such as potential output, can be counter-productive, because it could induce an
attitude that is not responsive enough to inflation or deflation.
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* Bank of Italy, Economic Research Department.1. Introduction
1
The recent literature on optimal monetary policy characterizes the behavior of a central
bank in the face of uncertainty as the outcome of an optimal procedure of signal extraction
on the state of the economy, given the set of available indicators and their precision.
2 The
central bank bases its actions on its forecasts of the target variables, rather than on simpler
rules of behavior. In an inflation-forecast targeting framework,
3 the policy instrument is set
so that the corresponding conditional inflation forecast is consistent with the inflation target;
the relative weight to give observable indicators only depends on their usefulness as an input
in conditional inflation projections. Any uncertainty in the forecasts is also factored in the
policy process, as the optimal reaction to an indicator variable also inversely depends on the
indicator’s precision. Nominal variables do not play a particularly distinct role in a policy-
maker’s reaction function, unlike real variables, as both are considered only for their
information content on the state of the economy.
4 These conclusions have practical
implications: the role of money in some central banks’ strategy was criticized, arguing that
the relative weight to place on money should depend exclusively on “how useful current
money growth is as an input in conditional forecasts of inflation” (Svensson and Woodford,
2003a).
These considerations seem hard to reconcile with some central bankers’ opinions.
Doubts on the adoption of a strict forecast targeting strategy were expressed, on the grounds
of the limited reliability and precision of projections. As an example, at the time of choosing
the policy strategy for the European central bank, the possibility of “projections of inflation
playing an important role in guiding policy decisions” (European Monetary Institute, 1997)
                                                          
1 I thank Luca Dedola, Giuseppe Ferrero, Francesco Lippi, Daniele Terlizzese and Mike Woodford for
discussions on previous versions of this paper, as well as two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer
applies. E-mail: gaiotti.eugenio@insedia.interbusiness.it.
2 See in particular Svensson and Woodford (2003a).
3 Among others, see Svensson and Woodford (2002) and Svensson (2001).
4 This feature is common to the new generation of macroeconomic “forward-looking” models. Woodford
(1999) stresses that to solve the problem of price-level indeterminacy in a forward-looking model no feedback
to policy from any nominal variable is necessary.8
was considered. However, it was decided that a stable relationship between various
economic and financial indicators and future inflation could not be taken for granted at that
moment for the euro area as a whole. Later, when the Eurosystem’s output and inflation
projections were first published, it was stressed that they “play a useful but limited role in
the strategy” due to the unavoidable limitations of macroeconomic projections, such as their
strong dependence upon highly uncertain external assumptions (ECB, 2000).
 5
A casual reference to recent history could also raise some puzzling issues. At the
beginning of the 1980s, in a number of successful episodes of disinflation, monetary policy
was based on relatively simple rules of conduct, rather than on sophisticated signal
extraction. In contrast, in the 1970s a delayed or muted reaction to inflation was sometimes
justified by a careful – and on the face of it, rational – assessment of the information which
could help to disentangle the possible causes of observed inflation. A frequent line of
argument was that, as the appropriate policy reaction was dependent on the importance of
the causes of inflation  (wages, oil prices, demand, profits, temporary factors) and as
observed price changes only gave imprecise information on these causes, a moderate
reaction was deemed advisable in demand management.
6
Can excessive concern for signal extraction be counter-productive when facing
imprecise indicators? In this paper, I address the issue by studying how the implementability
of a policy rule obtained under optimal filtering (real determinacy of the R. E. equilibrium)
in a forward-looking model depends on the precision of the indicators, an issue that was
raised, but not thoroughly examined, by Aoki (2003). It is well known that some rules of
policy behavior may give rise to the possibility of self-fulfilling bursts of inflation and
output even in the absence of shocks to fundamentals (Woodford, 1999). This is a result
which should be regarded as extremely undesirable by every central banker, as Carlstrom
and Fuerst (2000) effectively point out. Clarida, Galì and Gertler (1998) study the
indeterminacy of equilibrium stemming from the US policy rule in the 1970s, and consider it
                                                          
5 Similar, if more extreme, arguments were also put forward concerning developing countries. Masson,
Savastano and Sharma (1997) argue that the conditions for an inflation targeting framework are difficult to
satisfy where “the lack of a coherent analytical framework for … forecasting inflation” tends to “impair both
the central banks’ capacity to formulate monetary policy and the external observability to assess monetary
developments”.
6 Some examples of the Italian policy debate are collected in Balloni (1974).9
a case of policy-induced macroeconomic instability. The issue of implementability was
extensively addressed and discussed for the models under complete information (Woodford,
1999, Clarida, Galì and Gertler, 1998); the case under partial information was only touched
upon by Aoki (2003) for a particular instance, but not addressed further. My aim is to
examine it more extensively; I show that, unlike the case studied by Aoki, in a number of
circumstances the cautious policy behavior induced by imprecise information may lead to
real indeterminacy, unless some additional rule of behavior is adopted.
My strategy is the following. I derive optimal rules (the optimal response of the policy
instrument to the behavior of present and past observable variables) in a standard forward-
looking macroeconomic model with partial information, following the filtering procedure
proposed by Svensson and Woodford (2003a), under different assumption on the parameters,
on the information set and on the noise in the indicators. Then, I assume the policy-maker
follows this rule and I study the dynamics of the model to see whether the equilibrium is
determinate or whether self-fulfilling expectation shocks arise.
A first result is that the implementability of the optimal policy depends on the
precision of the indicators of endogenous variables. In a simple model, for a central bank
targeting inflation projections the determinacy problem gets worse, the less precise are the
available indicators, because the ‘optimal’ reaction to observed endogenous variables gets
smaller. If the indicators of inflation are too noisy, sunspots arise.
In this case, considering the set of simple rules for which the equilibrium is
determinate, it turns out that in order not to introduce too much noise in the economy they
will typically rely somewhat more on a simple rule assigning relatively more weight to
observed inflation, and less to the observed output gap, than would be implied by the
solution derived from filtering. Intuitively, the policy-maker will want to depart from an
information filtering exercise and look for simpler nominal anchors.
A second result is that the availability of precise indicators of exogenous state
variables, such as potential output, increases the likelihood of indeterminacy, in contrast
with the previous case. Intuitively, the policy-maker endowed with good information on the
exogenous state will be induced to rely relatively more on it and less on the observations of10
endogenous variables like inflation and output; however, too little a response to endogenous
variables rules out determinacy.
The possibility that imprecise indicators lead to indeterminacy increases when the
economy is hit by both cost-push shocks and demand shocks, which complicates the signal-
extraction problem. More interestingly, indeterminacy is less likely to happen, ceteris
paribus, when the policy-maker’s preferences assign a larger weight to inflation; this result
suggests that there may be an advantage in appointing a “conservative” central banker even
when a commitment technology is available.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, some of the relevant contributions in
the literature are summarized. In section 3, assumptions on the available information are
added to a standard New Keynesian model and the question is asked whether, in such a
model, a rule obtained from the optimal filtering of information is sufficient to guarantee that
the rational expectation equilibrium is determinate. The answer is shown to depend on the
precision of the available indicators. In section 4, the features of a behavior that ensures
determinacy in such a context are studied. In section 5, a general case is addressed by
numerical simulation and the effects of changing some parameters are studied. Section 6
summarises the conclusions.
2. Policy rules, determinacy and partial information: related literature
Rudebusch and Svensson (1999) and Svensson (2001a) argue that the decision-making
process of central banks is properly modeled as an optimal targeting rule (a commitment to a
final target, pursued by making extensive use of all information, like inflation-forecast
targeting)
7, on the ground that central banks always consider all available information and do
not restrict themselves to behaving mechanically. In contrast, Clarida, Galì and Gertler
(1999) and Galì (2000), among others, study simple feedback instrument rules for the
                                                          
7 Svensson (2001a) distinguishes a general targeting rule, which takes the form of minimization of an
objective function for monetary policy in terms of the final goals, and a specific targeting rule, which takes the
form of minimization of a loss function penalizing deviations of projections from the target, which in turn
determines the value of the policy instrument. In contrast, an instrument rule directly links the policy
instrument to the behavior of some predetermined and observable variables; a forecast-based instrument rule
links the interest to the value of the inflation forecasts (the latter is proposed by Batini and Haldane, 1999 and11
interest rate, based on the consideration that it is unrealistic to assume that the policy-maker
has the information needed to implement optimal policies.
8
The implications of different policy rules – either optimal or simple ones – for the real
determinacy of the rational expectations equilibrium in forward-looking macro models have
been extensively addressed.
9 Woodford (1999, 2000b) shows that any targeting strategy that
is exclusively forward-looking (or, equivalently, any interest rule that does not include a
sufficient reaction to current or past endogenous variables) would not yield a unique
equilibrium and would be prone to sunspots. When the nominal rate does not increase
sufficiently in response to a rise in inflation, self-fulfilling bursts of inflation and output are
possible even without shocks to fundamentals. Woodford (2000a) defines as ‘Taylor’s
principle’ the condition that interest rates should increase more than the inflation rate (i. e.,
real rates must rise with inflation), which is usually sufficient for real determinacy. Clarida,
Galì and Gertler (1998 and 1999) also study the consistency of various simple policy rules
with the possibility of persistent, self-fulfilling fluctuations in inflation and output. They
argue that the observed failure of Taylor’s principle in the US in the 1970s is a case of
macroeconomic instability induced by policy.
Galì (2000) and Woodford (2000a) show that an optimal rule obtained as a solution to
the monetary policy problem under full information does not necessarily meet the
determinacy condition, in which case the optimal allocation is not implementable: i. e., if the
rule is followed mechanically, the optimal allocation would not necessarily be attained, due
to the possibility of sunspots. They show how appropriate modifications to the rule’s
parameters (namely, an increase in the reaction to inflation) make it consistent with Taylor’s
principle; under full information, such a modified rule implements the optimal allocation.
                                                                                                                                                                                  
criticized by Svensson, 2001b).
8 Rotemberg and Woodford (1999) and Levin et al. (1999) compared empirically the relative performance
of simple vs. optimal rules.
9 The literature on determinacy is extensive and cannot be satisfactorily summarized here. Among others,
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) show, by means of a discrete-time, money-in-the-utility-function model, that
minor differences in trading environment result in large differences in the policy restrictions needed to ensure
real determinacy.
 Christiano and Rostagno (2001) review ways in which a monetary policy characterized by a
Taylor rule can induce volatility in the economy, due to the possible indeterminacy of equilibrium, and show a
case in which monitoring ranges for the money supply can reduce the problem. Bullard and Mitra (2000) study
the stability of rational expectation equilibria under learning dynamics, and provide conditions for unique
equilibria. On the implications of learning,  see Evans and Honkapohja (2001).12
In contrast, the implications of partial information for real determinacy have been less
extensively addressed in the economic literature. The main exception is Aoki (2003), who
shows that the presence of measurement errors in current output and inflation induces a
degree of policy cautiousness;
10 he argues that an indeterminacy problem may then arise
when indicators are very noisy, but he rules out that possibility for his model. The issue of
determinacy has not been extensively addressed within the general framework introduced by
Svensson and Woodford (2003a), which is now the standard tool in the analysis of optimal
policy under partial information. This contribution shows how to solve an information
variable problem in a model with forward-looking variables. With symmetric information of
the public and the central bank,
11 rational expectations and a quadratic loss function,
certainty equivalence and the separation principle apply: optimal policy can first be
expressed as a function of the estimated state of the economy, with the same formulation as
if the state were observed; the link between the state variables and the observable indicators
then depends on the signal-to-noise ratio. As an implication, the relative weight to place on
an indicator only depends on how useful it is in forecasting the target variable.
The contribution of this paper is a study of the relation between the noise in the
indicators (of either endogenous or exogenous variables) and indeterminacy, in a forward-
looking model solved à la Svensson-Woodford (2003a).
3. Noisy indicators and self-fulfilling expectations in a simple model
The benchmark model, widely used in the current macroeconomic literature (e. g., see
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10 Orphanides (2003a) also stresses that noisy information implies cautious policy, which he considers a
desirable outcome as it avoids excessive activism.
11 Svensson and Woodford (2003b) extend the analysis to a case of asymmetric information.13
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which will be removed later. That is, I rule out cost-push and potential output shocks, as well
as persistence in demand shocks. The assumption on λ is equivalent to assuming the unique
objective of price stability:
 12
(8) 0 = t π
Substituting (8) into (1) and  (2) and taking expectations, the optimal solution under
full information can be written in terms of the underlying shock
13.
                                                          
12 In absence of ‘cost-push’ shocks, this reproduces the frictionless equilibrium, as shown by Galì 2000. By
this assumption, I rule out time-consistency problems for the moment.
13 Here,  ) ( 1 t t t y y i − ≡ + σ  is defined as the observable component of the ‘natural’ interest rate. Under the
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Woodford (2000a) and Galì (2000) show that, under (9) one cannot rule out the
existence of multiple paths and self-fullfilling fluctuations in expectations. Woodford (1999)
shows that in a model of this kind any policy rule which is only a function of exogenous
state variables, such as (9), implies that the rational expectations equilibrium is
indeterminate. The standard way to study determinacy is by adding to the model (1)-(3) a
reaction function which adds the output gap and inflation to (9).
(10) t P t t Y
D
t t t y y i i π σε Φ + − Φ + = − ) (
In equilibrium, the two reaction functions (9) and (10) are equivalent, since yt=yt,
πt=0, but the dynamics are different. Substituting (10) into (1) and (2), one obtains the
dynamic system:















































The necessary and sufficient condition for  (11) to have a unique solution is that both
roots of the characteristic equation of the system  (11) lie outside the unit circle. This
amounts to:
14
 (12) 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( > Φ − + − Φ Y P k β
A large enough reaction of the interest rate to output and inflation is needed to anchor
the expectations. A sufficient condition is that the nominal interest rates react more than one
for one to inflation (φP>1), so that the real interest rate rises if inflation rises, defined by
Woodford (2000a) as “Taylor’s principle”. As Galì (2000) points out, under certainty, any
choice of a ‘large’ coefficient on inflation in the reaction function implements the optimal
policy, as, in equilibrium, inflation and the output gap are zero, and ex post (10) corresponds
to (9). The reaction coefficients in (10) are merely a virtual threat to increase the interest rate
should inflation deviate from equilibrium, which does not actually need to be exercised.
                                                          
14 A complete derivation is in Bullard and Mitra (2001)15
The same, however, is not true if partial information is introduced. I now assume that
both the private sector and the central bank have the same partial information, as in Svensson
and Woodford (2003a). I assume that the interest rate it is set while simultaneously observing
(and reacting to) variables at time t. The shock ε
D
t
  is not observable. For analytical
convenience in this example, the equilibrium level of output  t y  is also assumed to be
known. In contrast, current output yt is only observable with noise:
(13)
Y
t t t y y ε + = ˆ
Inflation  t π is also observable with noise.
(14) 
P
t t t ε π π + = ˆ
The measurement error of output and the measurement error of prices (
2 2, P Y σ σ  ) are assumed
to be known. Since certainty equivalence holds, the objective of the monetary authority
amounts to the attainment of a zero inflation projection in each period:
(15)  0 = t t π
which in turn implies the interest rate path:
(16) 
D
t t t t i i | σε = −
where πt|t and ε
D
 t|t are the optimal estimates of inflation and the demand shock, given the
available information in t.
The optimal estimate of the demand shock is a projection on the observables
t t t y y π ˆ , , ˆ . The coefficients of this conditional projection depend on the variances of the
unobserved disturbances.
15
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15 A derivation is in Appendix A.16
The solution for the interest rate is then obtained by substituting (17) into (16):
(18)  t P t t Y t t y y i i π ϑ ϑ ˆ ) ˆ (
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In (18) the interest rate optimally reacts to the observed output gap and headline
inflation. As implied by certainty equivalence, the coefficient on the estimated demand
shock ε
D
t|t in (16) does not depend on the precision of the signals, while the coefficients
linking this estimated value to the observables ( y ˆ , ˆ π ) in (17) do. As a consequence, the
reaction to the observed output gap and to observed headline inflation in (19) also depends
on the variances of the demand shock, the measurement error in the gap and the erratic
component of inflation. The relative weight of inflation vis-à-vis the output gap in the
reaction function is proportional to its role as an input to forecast the state variable. If the
signal-to-noise ratio is large, a large reaction to output and inflation is warranted. In contrast,
if the signal-to-noise ratio is small, the central bank, as in Aoki (2003), will not move much
in reaction to current signals.
Unlike under full information, the solution (18) already embodies a feedback from
endogenous variables, which is a necessary condition for determinacy.
16 To see whether the
sufficient condition for determinacy is also met, I rewrite the deterministic part of the system
including the reaction function (18) and check the eigenvalue condition. It is immediately
evident that this amounts to substituting the coefficients obtained from (19) in place of ΦP,


















                                                          
16 As mentioned, Woodford (1999) shows that a policy rule as (9) results in indeterminacy, because it is
only a function of exogenous states. However, this is not necessarily true of a rule such as (16), as expected
states are partly endogenous, because their estimate depends on endogenous variables.17
Fig. 1






















Condition (20) shows that, under partial information, the determinacy of equilibrium
depends on the quality of the information available to the policy-maker; determinacy fails if
the quality is not good enough. The expression is a function of the precisions of the
indicators (times the variance of the demand shock:  
2 2 2 2 , P D Y D σ σ σ σ ) and of the






Fig. 1 shows the region of determinacy of equilibrium as a function of the signal-to-
noise ratios, in the case σ=1 and k=0.3. When the signal-to-noise ratio is below the
threshold, uniqueness of equilibria is not guaranteed and self-fulfilling shocks to
expectations may arise.18
How restrictive this condition is depends on the parameters of the model. Some




Y and of the model’s parameters,
17 the
variance in the noisy component of inflation must be between 3 or 250 times smaller than the
variance of the aggregate demand shock. The size of this interval suggests that there is at
least a range of parameters for which the problem is relevant
18, contrary to the model by
Aoki (2003).
Tab. 1
CRITICAL VALUES FOR DETERMINACY







1 0.3 0.99 0.1 3.3
1 0.3 0.99 0.5 3.3
1 0.3 0.99 1.0 3.2
1 0.3 0.99 2.0 3.1
1 0.05 0.99 0.1 19.6
1 0.05 0.99 0.5 18.0
1 0.05 0.99 1.0 16.0
1 0.05 0.99 2.0 12.0
0.157 0.024 0.99 0.1 263.7
0.157 0.024 0.99 0.5 256.7
0.157 0.024 0.99 1.0 248.0
0.157 0.024 0.99 2.0 230.7
While imprecise signals on endogenous variables imply over-cautious behavior, the
opposite applies when direct indicators of the exogenous shock ε
D
t|t are available: more
precise direct information on the exogenous shock results in less reaction to inflation and
output and in real indeterminacy. This may be shown by assuming that the policy-maker also
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17 Parameters are taken from Bullard and Mitra, 2001 and Clarida et al 1999.
18 His result hinges on simplifying assumptions which guarantee that the optimal policy has always a
sufficient feedback from past output or inflation. The previous period’s output and inflation are assumed to be19
where ε
S
t is i. i. d. with zero mean and variance σ
2
S. In this case, it may be shown that the
expression for the optimal predictor of the demand shock becomes:












































Substituting into (16), one obtains the interest rate rule:













































S tends to zero, the coefficients on the observed output gap and inflation also
tend to zero and the interest rate only reacts to the exogenous variable t S ˆ , which violates
(12). This is a consequence of the general principle that a policy rule which does not include
a feedback from the endogenous variables, but only reacts to exogenous states, leads to
indeterminacy. In this context, the policy-maker would not pay much attention to the
behavior of endogenous variables if he already had good information on the underlying state
of the economy. This result has some interesting implications for the role that should be
assigned to “precise” direct measures of potential in the conduct of monetary policy; these
implications are discussed in the extended version of the model in section 5 below.
4.  Policy implementation when information is imprecise: the need for nominal
anchors
What if the determinacy condition is not met? The case of partial information has one
fundamental difference with respect to the full information case. Due to the noise
component, observed inflation and output ( y ˆ , ˆ π ) are not zero in equilibrium; a threat to react
to these variables if they deviate from target values has to be exercised, in which case the
central bank would also be reacting to noise, not only to changes in fundamentals.
19 Hence,
                                                                                                                                                                                  
observed with absolute precision, giving information on the (unobserved) natural interest rate.
19 This is also argued by Woodford (2000a): “complete reliance upon the threat of extreme responses of
inflation and output gap variations is not obviously the most desirable approach” to guarantee a determinate
equilibrium, as “the random noise in the particular measure to which the central bank responds might require
violent adjustments of interest rates, that in turn create havoc in the economy”. Similar considerations are
expressed by Galì (2000).20
implementability comes at a cost, as it adds volatility to output and inflation. As a
consequence, not all choices of large ϑY, ϑP are equally efficient. In general, once noise is
taken into account, it will no longer be optimal to respond to the indicators in proportion to
their information content for the state variables.
An intuition can be obtained by examining a policy rule whose coefficients are large
enough to satisfy the determinacy constraint but at the same time small enough to minimize
the noise which is introduced in the economy by reacting to imprecise indicators. Under the
simplifying assumptions adopted in the previous section, such a rule is found by assuming a
generic reaction function in terms of the observable variables  t t t y y π ˆ ), ˆ ( −  and finding the
value of the coefficients in that function that minimize the period loss function, subject to an
inequality constraint. The reaction function is assumed to be as:
(24) t P t t Y t t y y i i π ϑ ϑ ˆ ) ˆ ( + − + =
and the coefficients are constrained to satisfy the condition:
(25) ζ ϑ β ϑ ≥ − + − Y P k ) 1 ( ) 1 (
where ζ is a small positive number, arbitrarily close to zero. The model augmented by (24)
























Minimizing (26) subject to the inequality constraint (25), the first-order conditions (see
Appendix B) are:
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where ϑ*Y, ϑ* P are the same as in (19) and ∆>0.21
If the variance of the measurement errors is small enough, the constraint is not binding
(h≤0) and the solution (27) applies, which coincides with the one previously obtained. If the
constraint is binding as in (28) (h≥0), both coefficients must be larger than in the
unconstrained solution. Moreover, since 0<β<1, the proportional increase in the reaction
coefficient on headline inflation (ϑP) is always larger than the proportional increase in the
coefficient on the output gap (ϑY). The behavior of the ratio ϑP/ϑY, as a function of h, is
shown in Fig. 2. The larger h is, the larger is the relative weight to be placed on the inflation
term.
Fig. 2













Hence, imprecise indicators call for a relatively larger reaction to inflation than to the
gap, all other things being equal. While a large enough reaction to the output gap may in
principle deliver price level determinacy (as argued by Woodford, 1999), using the gap as an
anchor would be quite undesirable. Since the coefficient associated with ϑY in the constraint
(25) is small, a large reaction would be needed, which would result in a large noise being
transmitted through policy.22
Equations (27) and (28) show that, in order to rule out self-fulfilling bursts of inflation,
the policy-maker should combine the efficient use of all available information (implicit in
the derivation of ϑ*Y, ϑ*P ) with simpler rules of conduct based on nominal variables, such
as the constraint that real rates will in any case not decrease in response to observed inflation
(Taylor’s principle). This may be interpreted as an insurance against the risk of being too
cautious when the information is imprecise. From this perspective, the fact that simple rules
of behavior played a crucial role in the disinflation at the end of the 1970s turns out not to be
inconsistent with the claim that central banks try to make efficient use of all available
information, as argued by Rudebusch and Svensson (1999).
5. A more general case
In this section, I relax the simplifying assumptions made above. I allow for cost-push
shocks, shocks to potential output, a policy-maker also caring about output (λ≠0),
autocorrelation in the cost-push and demand shocks and shocks to potential output. I assume
a direct, but noisy, observation of potential, adding the equation 
YBAR
t t t y y ε ˆ ˆ + = . I solve the
model numerically for both discretion and commitment.
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Similarly, the period loss function may be written as:
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and the measurement equation as:
 (31)
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t t t y X ) , , ( ε ε ≡  and the vector of indicators
T
t t t t y y Z ) ˆ , ˆ , ˆ ( π = . By applying the Kalman filter, as in Svensson and Woodford (2003a),
one obtains the recursive expression for the expected states in terms of the observables.
(32) ] [ 1 | 1 | | − − − + = t t t t t t t Z Z U X X
The expression for the matrix U, which depends on A1, B, C
1, Ci, W, D
1, and the
covariance matrices of ut and νt, is derived in Svensson and Woodford (2003a).The optimal
reaction function can be written in terms of the expected states:
(33) 1 | 1 3 | 2 1 1 − − − Υ + Υ + Υ = t t t t t t X X i i
where the expression for the matrices Y1, Y2, Y3  is reported in Gerali and Lippi (2003). They
show that, under commitment, the reaction function (33) is dependent on the past history of
expected states, while under discretion it is Y1=Y3=0. By recursive substitution, using the
transition equation (29) and the measurement equation (31), Xt|t-1 and Z t|t-1 in (32) can be
expressed as a distributed lag of Xt-1|t-1 Consequently, Xt|t  can then be written as a distributed
lag of the indicators Zt:




where E(L) is a matrix polynomial in the lag operator. Xt|t can then be substituted in the
reaction function.





implementing the Kalman filtering approach by Svensson and Woodford (2003a) with the
Mat-lab package by Gerali and Lippi (2003). For a given linear forward-looking model and a
set of assumptions on the information set, the package computes and simulates the optimal24
policy (33) as a function of the expected states, both under discretion and commitment. I
then rewrite the policy rule as an optimal instrument rule, substituting the expected states
with an appropriate number of lags of the observable indicators ( t t t y y ˆ , ˆ , ˆ π ) and of the
interest rate itself.
20 I then consider the dynamics of the whole model, computing the
eigenvalues of its deterministic part. To have determinacy, two eigenvalues must lie outside
the unit circle.
21
The charts show the second largest eigenvalue as a function of the noise in each signal
(respectively, the measure of output, inflation and potential output) and as a function of the
preferences of the central banker (the weight of output in the loss function). The result is
reported both under discretion (continuous line) and under commitment (dotted line).
 22
An increase in the noise in the inflation observation, or in the noise in the output
observation (Fig. 3 and 4), causes the second largest eigenvalue to decrease, which confirms
the finding of the simple model of the previous sections. When the observation of output is
less precise, it is more difficult to interpret the movements in observed inflation and to
attribute them to the underlying cost and demand shock. As a consequence, the reaction to
inflation is more muted and could be insufficient to ensure determinacy. This holds both
under discretion and under commitment. To be sure, commitment implies more history-
dependence, which favors determinacy; in each of the above charts the dotted line (obtained
under commitment) is above the continuous line (obtained under discretion). However, even
under commitment, the second largest eigenvalue is not necessarily outside the unit circle.
                                                          
20 The policy rule is obtained by regressing the simulated policy instrument from the Gerali and Lippi
package on the set of simulated current and lagged observables and on its own lags. By construction, the
projection holds exactly, provided the lag length is appropriate.
21 The eigenvalues are computed by writing the dynamic system in matrix form, considering the vector of
the two forward-looking variables (output and inflation) and the predetermined variables which enter the policy
rule (i. e., lagged output, inflation and interest rate, with the lag depending on the form of the rule).
22 All charts refer to a benchmark specification with λ=0.25, a unit standard deviation of the demand shock,
the cost-push shock and the noise in observed output, and a standard deviation of observed inflation equal to
0.25.Fig. 3
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The second largest eigenvalue is also negatively related to the weight of output in the
objective function (Fig. 5): a conservative central banker is less likely to run into problems
of sunspots due to imprecise signals. The intuition is the following. When the weight of
output (λ) is larger, the optimal reaction to observed inflation depends on the identification
of the source of the underlying shocks (cost-push or demand shocks). Therefore, with
imprecise information, the response to inflation is more muted. This is less true for a
conservative central banker (small λ), who, ceteris paribus, would react more to observed
inflation, no matter whether it is demand-driven or cost-determined. The result also holds
under commitment. An important conclusion is that, in this framework, some degree of
conservativeness may be beneficial even when a commitment technology is available;
conservativeness induces the policy-maker to be less hesitant in reacting to inflation in the
face of uncertainty.
Fig. 6 shows that the less precise is the direct measure of potential, the larger is the
second eigenvalue. In this case a precise direct observation of an exogenous variable,
potential output, induces less reaction to observed inflation; symmetrically, more noise in the
measure of potential would favor a more reactive policy. In the latter case observed inflation
provides information on the - poorly observed - output gap and calls for adjusting policy
aggressively. Too much direct information on potential “hurts”, as the policy-maker relies on
it and reacts too little to observed inflation.
Interestingly, the result somewhat recalls the argument of Orphanides (2003b), that an
excessive reliance by the Fed on a potential output measure prompted the accommodation of
inflation in the 1970s. However, the framework is quite different. The argument of
Orphanides centers on the claim that at the time potential was overestimated by the Fed,
which in turn produced a systematic bias in policy (a systematically too low level of the
policy rate). In contrast, the model in this section allows for no systematic bias in the
potential output measure; the problem does not lie in a wrong level of the interest rate, but in
an insufficient threat to react to possible future acceleration of prices, thus accommodating
self-fulfilling inflation expectations.  Here, good information on potential (therefore, on the
‘right’ level of interest rates) makes the policy-maker shy in reacting to imprecisely observed
inflation.28
Tab. 2
OPTIMAL RULES AND DETERMINACY OF EQUILIBRIUM
a) discretion
standard deviation autocorrelation standard deviation  optimal rule coefficients: largest
of innovations: of innovations: of measurement error: eigenvalues
cost- de- poten- de- cost- infla- output poten-
push mand tial mand push tion tial i(t-1) i(t-2) y(t) p(t) y(t-1) p(t-1)
(1) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0,25 1,5 0 - - 0,44 0,80 - - 1,51 0,99
(2) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0,25 1,5 0 - - 0,44 0,12 - - 1,57 0,93
(3) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0,25 10 0 - - 0,01 0,09 - - 1,25 0,81
(4) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0,25 1,5 1 0,38 - 0,44 0,13 -0,17 -0,04 1,57 0,93
(5) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0,25 1,5 10 0,91 - 0,44 0,30 -0,41 -0,11 1,51 1,06
(6) 1 1 1 0 0,25 0,25 0,25 1,5 0 0,26 - 0,46 0,33 -0,01 -0,08 1,64 0,96
(7) 1 1 1 0 0,8 0,8 0,25 1,5 0 0,81 -0,01 0,71 0,85 -0,01 -0,65 2,18 1,01
λ
b) commitment
standard deviation autocorrelation standard deviation  optimal rule coefficients: largest 
of innovations: of innovations: of measurement error: eigenvalues
cost- de- poten- de- cost- infla- output poten-
push mand tial mand push tion tial i(t-1) i(t-2) y(t) p(t) y(t-1) p(t-1) y(t-2) p(t-2)
(1) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0,25 1,5 0 - - 0,44 0,80 - - - - 1,51 0,99
(2) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0,25 1,5 0 0,99 - 0,44 0,03 -0,44 -0,05 - -1 , 5 7 0 , 9 6
(3) 1 1 1 0 0 0 0,25 10 0 0,98 - 0,01 0,01 -0,01 -0,05 - - 1,27 0,92
(4) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0,25 1,5 1 1,38 -0,38 0,44 0,04 -0,61 -0,07 0,17 0,02 1,58 0,97
(5) 1 1 1 1 0 0 0,25 1,5 10 1,91 -0,91 0,44 0,22 -0,85 -0,25 0,40 0,04 1,48 1,16
(8) 1 1 1 0 0,25 0,25 0,25 1,5 0 0,26 0,00 0,46 0,25 0,00 -0,06 - - 1,66 0,96
1 1 1 0 0,8 0,8 0,25 1,5 0 1,81 -0,82 0,71 0,75 -0,72 -1,30 0,01 0,58 2,17 1,04
λ λ
Common parameters: k=0.05, σ=1, β=0.99. The indicator of potential output also enters the optimal policy
rule but it is not reported in the table.
Table 2 provides some numerical examples of the optimal rule obtained under different
– and rather arbitrary – assumptions on the parameters, under discretion and commitment. In
each panel, rows 1 to 3 show that the introduction of a non-zero standard deviation of the
cost-push shock (increased from 0 to 1) and a larger noise in the output indicator (increased
from 1.5 to 10) make it more likely that the “Taylor principle” will fail; in the case under
discretion, the inflation coefficient in the policy rule decreases from 0.8 to 0.09. Rows 4 and
5 show that more noise in the potential output indicator (increased from 1 to 10), yields a
policy that is more persistent and more responsive to observed inflation, which satisfies the
determinacy condition (the second eigenvalue moves outside the unit circle). Rows 6 and 7
show that adding persistence in the shocks (the auto-correlation terms are increased to either
0.25 or 0.8) yields a more history-dependent policy and a larger response to inflation;
however, in this example, the determinacy condition is satisfied only for high values of the
auto-correlation parameter.29
6. Conclusions
When agents are forward-looking, policy-makers should react in a sufficiently decisive
manner to the behavior of inflation. If the indicators of endogenous variables over the
relevant horizon are not very precise, policy-makers move less, as Aoki (2003) and
Orphanides (2003a) have shown. This paper shows that it is possible that they move too
little: below a threshold of minimal precision of the indicators, the solution of an optimal
signal extraction problem does not yield a viable rule of behavior and may induce self-
fulfilling fluctuations of inflation and output. It may be argued that such a ‘rational shyness’
in the face of uncertainty prevailed at some point in the 1970s, contributing to Taylor’s
principle not being respected and inflation expectations picking up.
The exercise sheds light on some characteristics of a desirable monetary policy in this
context. Projections of output and inflation over the relevant horizon cannot be the only
criterion for determining monetary policy actions unless they are very precise, nor should the
weight assigned to the various indicators necessarily be proportional to their information
content for the final targets. Simple rules, which include a reaction to nominal variables, may
at times be necessary to supply an anchor for prices, even when the policy-maker still
intends to consider all relevant information. Appointing a “conservative” central banker,
who will act less timidly in response to signs of inflation or deflation even when the
difficulty in interpreting these signs would otherwise call for cautiousness, may be an
appropriate choice even without time consistency problems. Relying too much on measures
of potential output unrelated to the observed behavior of prices could also induce an attitude
that is not responsive enough to inflation or deflation.Appendix
Appendix A
The model to solve includes equations (1) (with εt
C≡0), (2), (13) and (14). The optimal
policy is πt+i|t  = 0, for i  ≥0.  By (1) and (2), this also implies  i t t i t y y + + = | , for i≥0. By
substituting into (2), the behavior of the interest rate implied by the optimal policy is
obtained as (16).
Information in t includes:
] , , , , , , ˆ , , , , , ˆ [
2 2 2
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Substituting (16) into (36) and solving, one finds the solution:
23

















| + − =
                                                          
23 In this simple case this is equivalent to applying the Svensson and Woodford (2003a) Kalman filter
formulae.31
Appendix B
I substitute πt+i|t = 0,  1 | 1 + + = t t t y y  into (1) (with εt
C≡0) and (2). I also substitute (24) in
(2) and solve for πt, obtaining:
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When the constraint is not binding (g≥0,  λ=0), the value of  P Y ϑ ϑ ,  is given by




























Substituting (41) into g, it is also:





















When the constraint is binding (g=0, λ≥0), the value of  P Y ϑ ϑ ,  can be obtained from
the F.O.C.s   0 / / = ∂ ∂ − ∂ ∂ i i g L ϑ λ ϑ  and g=0:32
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Moreover, from the condition λ≥0 one derives:
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